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Transparency and Efficiency in Government Operations: 
New Orleans Civil Service Reform 
 
Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J. 
 
It may strike some students of history as ironic, if not contradictory, to talk about civil service 
reform. The civil service movement was the reform.1 Some of that skepticism was apparent in the 
response we received from many city employees when we began exploring the idea of reforming 
the city’s civil service in post-Katrina New Orleans, and it was understandable. The city employees 
we talked with expressed fear that we would be returning to the colorful days of Governor Huey 
Long, when political patronage was based on who you knew and not what you knew. They 
assumed there were only two options: the civil service system they were operating under and the 
spoils system that existed under Huey Long. Their reaction was further complicated by fear of 
change. Another important background element was the trauma of Katina and post-Katrina New 
Orleans. People in New Orleans had experienced change on almost every level of their lives. Now, 
for civil servants, there was another change coming, and it seemed to threaten their jobs and their 
pensions. 
 
Understanding Reform: Ecclesia semper reformanda est  
With rare exceptions, change is not easy for most human beings and it is even more challenging 
for systems and groups of people.2 While many people may see problems in their present 
circumstances (individually or as part of an organization), it is often easier to live with what you 
have and what you know rather than to try to make serious changes. Holding onto the current 
situation, though pathological, may seem safer than moving into the unknown by accepting 
change. 
We certainly encountered resistance to change when we began the effort to reform civil 
service after Katrina. The US civil service system began its evolution in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries when progressive Republicans such as Theodore Roosevelt sought to 
reform the old spoils systems. The Louisiana patronage system is a great example of how things 
were done in government before civil service.3 But people forget that societies, like the human 
beings who make them up, are dynamic and changing. That means that the systems that serve 
society ought to change and adjust just as society does. One of the brilliant insights of the authors 
of the US Constitution is that the document they created can change and evolve to meet the 
changing needs of the nation.  
 
The Need for Change: Evaluating the Civil Service System 
One characteristic of New Orleans is that the past is always present. Many of its citizens, 
dramatically affected by Katrina, had rarely, if ever, left the city. The exodus of a large portion of  
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the population to other US cities after Katrina, however, helped longtime residents see that there 
are different ways of running a school system and operating local government. Many people had 
not noticed that there had been significant developments in the legal and regulatory protections 
around workers. Between the influence of the past (e.g., Huey Long) and the lack of change in any 
social system, the aftermath of Katrina was devastating to the psyche of New Orleans city 
employees.  
The effort to understand and evaluate the New Orleans civil service system began with some 
extensive work that involved looking at other systems and listening to those using the system in 
New Orleans.4 In evaluating the civil service system, as it existed, we found from a survey of city 
employees conducted in 2012 that only 18 percent of employees agreed “that the current city civil 
service system [was] effective”; 58 percent disagreed. When asked whether the system was 
“efficient,” 17 percent agreed, while almost 60 percent disagreed. The hiring process received even 
lower marks, and only 29 percent agreed that “poor performance [was] dealt with effectively on 
[their] team.” 
Managers and supervisors were equally harsh in their judgments about the system as it existed. 
Only 16 percent agreed that hiring “occurs quickly enough to meet the needs of [their] 
department/office”; 5 percent said they were “able to hire the best candidates at the appropriate 
salary to support the needs” of their department or office; and 15 percent said they were “able to 
promote qualified employees” when needed. Thirteen percent agreed that the system “gives 
[managers] the flexibility to create positions of the type and number [they] need,” while 23 percent 
felt that it “allows [managers’] to hire the best candidates for the position.” 
In addition to the survey, there were interviews with more than seventy-five city employees, 
managers, and stakeholders, four focus groups (including one with almost all department heads 
and executive leadership), and half a dozen meetings with top civil service staff. Along the way, 
the city heard predominantly troubling stories. Under the “rule of three,” hiring managers had to 
choose one of three candidates rated most qualified by the Civil Service Department, based on test 
scores (if a test is done for that position) and work experience but never on interviews or reference 
checks. Not surprisingly, after interviews and reference checks, managers often found those top 
three candidates unsuitable. As one manager explained, “I have been forced to choose between 
bad, worse, and worst.” 
Qualifications written by the Civil Service Department were often so rigid that managers 
could not hire those candidates they considered best suited because, though they may have exactly 
the experience the manager needs, they do not have the degree or credentials predetermined by 
civil service staff. The qualifications for web developers, for instance, favor those with the most 
certifications. But as most people in the IT field know, the best web developers often do not have 
time to take courses and accumulate certifications; they are too busy learning cutting-edge 
technology in real time and responding to the high demand for their services. 
Another relic of the civil service system was that managers were forced to pay new employees 
at the bottom of their pay range. One department lost about a quarter of the candidates to whom it 
made job offers in a span of two years because of this problem. On the survey, a staggering 80 
percent of managers agreed that the current system “allows [managers] to set the pay for new hires 
equal to their knowledge, skills and ability to perform the job well.” 
Managers were constantly concerned about losing good employees because they could not 
raise their pay or promote them. Under the system, promotions were based on employees’ years 
of service and roster of training courses taken, most of which employees judged to be irrelevant 
and not on managers’ assessments of their performance. In the survey, less than a quarter of 
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employees agreed with the statement, “Supervisors, managers, and department heads have the 
ability to promote employees who exhibit outstanding performance.” One department had a 
management analyst with a track record of high performance (as well as a law degree) but could 
not promote him to the next classification in the job series because people who had taken seven 
irrelevant training classes trumped him on the list. 
In the civil service system as it existed, hiring could take six months or longer, and everything 
was done on paper. Managers found the written tests for many positions outdated and irrelevant. 
Paper-and-pencil tests may have made sense for most positions when many government employees 
were clerks, but those measures have been studied by the US Office of Personnel Management 
and found to have low correlation with future job performance. 
Finally, the employee evaluation system was a waste of time according to virtually everyone 
we asked. Few managers rated employees honestly because doing so had no upside and multiple 
downsides, including employee anger, low morale, and time-consuming grievances or appeals. A 
2010 study by the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M reported 
that only 1 out of every 250 employees in New Orleans had been rated unfavorably in the previous 
seven years. In the 2012 survey, only 12 percent of supervisors claimed to regularly rate employees 
“unsatisfactory” or “needs improvement.”5 
Both the Bush School report and a more in-depth report by the Bureau of Government 
Research (BGR) in 2004 recommended fundamental changes in the civil service system. The BGR 
report summed it up this way: 
Predictably, New Orleans’ human resources system suffers from the flaws inherent in a 
rule-bound and bureaucracy laden system. It is simply too complex and cumbersome, and 
often too slow, to meet the challenges of hiring and retaining an effective government work 
force. The system is beset with problems and inefficiencies at every level. In many cases, 
bureaucratic steps created in the name of merit ultimately worked against the production 
of the most qualified work force. In addition, efforts to hire and reward high performers 
are handicapped by a number of failings and systemic problems, including a lack of 
flexibility in hiring and compensating employees and a meaningless evaluation system.6 
Problems like these are typical of traditional civil service systems, which were created for 
industrial-era bureaucracies filled with simple, rote jobs. Many governments have therefore 
reformed their systems over the past twenty-five years. Half of federal employees, for instance, 
have been removed from the federal civil service system, and several states have phased out their 
systems altogether. Many cities have long functioned without civil service systems. Moreover, 
other cities and states have modernized their rules, eliminating the rule of three, using fewer written 
tests, giving managers more flexibility to set pay and promote high performers, and creating pay-
for-performance systems. 
Civil service systems were created for a good reason, and they have largely accomplished 
their purpose. In our society, many rules and laws have developed in the past fifty years to protect 
all workers in their place of employment. During that time, however, the civil service system in 
New Orleans did not reinvent itself. Thus, it contributed to a lowering of employee morale and 
impeded the implementation of a merit-based system. Rather than evolving with the changing 
times, New Orleans’s civil service system developed and adapted by adding more and more rules 
that functioned as straitjackets for both employees and their managers. In return for making 
patronage and political manipulation of employees difficult, the system made good management 
almost impossible. Managers found it difficult to hire those they wanted, to promote and reward 
those who performed best, and to fire those who failed to perform. Without these essential tools, 
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public organizations had trouble responding to citizens’ needs, and when they did respond, service 
was often ponderously slow and performance was mediocre at best. Nevertheless, after Hurricane 
Katrina, despite the lack of rewards inherent in the system, dedicated civil servants performed their 
duties to the best of their abilities. 
 
The Evolution and Development of a System: The Great Place to Work 
Initiative 
In April 2014, Mayor Mitch Landrieu launched the Great Place to Work Initiative. Acknowledging 
that the New Orleans personnel system had for decades been in need of modernizing, the mayor 
announced that the Civil Service Commission had approved a series of reforms that would move 
“the City of New Orleans into the twenty-first century.” Those reforms included an increase in the 
city employee minimum wage to $10.10 an hour. “Since taking office,” the mayor said, “we 
committed to delivering New Orleans residents a more effective government that responds to their 
needs.” Through the Great Place to Work Initiative reforms, the mayor promised that the city 
would be “a more attractive place for employees, and our managers will be able to choose the most 
meritorious and fit candidates from a larger field of qualified candidates.”7  
The Great Place to Work Initiative rule changes offered the following: 
Process Improvements 
• Leaves in place the same Civil Service protections against hiring candidates who do 
not possess the knowledge, skill and ability to perform the work the job requires. 
• Gives more decision making to the managers who know the work requirements best. 
• Allows managers to hire the most meritorious candidate who took the competitive 
examination and was determined qualified by the Department of Civil Service. 
• Increase Civil Service’s ability to [post] existing job classifications to speed hiring and 
sets meaningful performance goals for the personnel function of City government. 
• Gives all employees the right to take at least one training per month, regardless of intent 
to take a promotional exam. 
• Evaluate the performance of new employees before their job becomes permanent. 
Pay Improvements 
• Increases the minimum wage for all City employees to $10.10 per hour. 
• Allows department directors to give pay increases within the already-approved pay 
range for special assignments without prior approval from Civil Service. 
• Gives all departments an equal percentage of 2% of their approved budget for 
performance based pay increases to employees each year. Employees who successfully 
achieve their objective goals will receive a 1.25% increase and employees who meet 
their goals and perform excellently will be eligible to receive a 3.75% increase. 
• Allows managers use the full approved salary range for jobs with recruitment 
challenges or candidates with exceptional qualifications. This requires objective 
justification and oversight.8 
After the reforms were announced, in my capacity as chair of the New Orleans Civil Service 
Commission, I announced that the commission was “committed to ensuring merit-based decisions 
regarding the recruitment, selection, training, evaluation, management and retention of skilled and 
capable individuals who provide excellent service to the citizens of New Orleans.”9 I felt confident 
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that once the reforms took effect, the city’s Civil Service Commission would be more efficient and 
more supportive of its employees. 
Erika McConduit-Diggs, president and CEO of the Urban League of Greater New Orleans, 
praised the commission for implementing the reforms, expressing the league’s strong support for 
their efforts to “bring about greater diversity within all ranks and city departments.” LaTanja 
Silvester, president of the SEIU Local 21LA, pointed out that the vote signaled that the Landrieu 
administration “understands that raising the minimum wage so that it can keep up with rising prices 
on the basic necessities of life is not only a plus for the workers, but also a huge step in the right 
direction for our great city.”10 
For employees, the changes approved in 2014 allow for merit-based pay increases to those 
who perform well, higher entrance salaries when necessary to make the city competitive with other 
cities, more opportunities for relevant and transferable training, and a fairer and more objective 
approach to evaluations. The rule changes did nothing to weaken the rights employees have to 
appeal disciplinary actions. 
For managers, these improvements allow them far more ability to hire, retain, promote, and 
reward high performers, to motivate their employees, and to give actionable performance 
improvement plans to low performers. 
For the public, in the coming years these reforms should result in better service, a higher 
quality of life, and a city personnel system that is a model public service organization. 
For the city’s elected officials, these reforms should produce a city workforce with higher 
morale, higher performance, and greater adaptability to change that should in turn yield a public 
that is more satisfied with their city’s government structures. 
Changing the rules and processes of civil service in New Orleans was only a first step. The 
older set of rules and ways of proceeding had created a culture that was stuck in the past and it will 
take time, with the implementation of the new rules and procedures, for a new culture to emerge 
and evolve. The staff of the Civil Service Department was inordinately attached to the way things 
had always been done and they harbored a suspicion of change. Their cooperation will be important 
to the implementation of the new rules and the development of a new culture. In a broader context, 
New Orleans is a city in love with the past, whether it was good or bad. In life after Katrina, New 
Orleans has embraced a new vision of itself to become a city better than it was before the storm. 
My hope is that that same spirit will be part of the transformation of civil service. 
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